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On May 29, 2014, in the midst of the Ukraine crisis, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Russia signed the agreement to build the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).1 The EEU 
has been showcased by Russian President Putin as an alternative to the European Union 
(EU; see chapter 11 Hancock/Libman). At the same time, the institutional design of the EEU 
with its planned common market and customs union resembles the EU to a large extent – 
with one exception: The EEU does not contain provisions to build supra-national institutions, 
it remains intergovernmental. Thus, the EEU represents a case of selective adoption of the 
EU model, of diffusion, but not convergence. As a result, it showcases what this chapter is 
about. 
How can we explain the emergence of regional institutions across the globe? There are basi-
cally two stylized explanations for regional cooperation and integration: The dominant ap-
proaches to regionalism argue that regional cooperation and integration come about resulting 
from independent decision-making within one region or part of the world. E.g., functional the-
ories of integration – such as neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 
1984; Zürn, 1992; Koremenos et al., 2001), neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958), or (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann, 1966; Moravcsik, 1998) start from conflicts or collective 
action problems emanating from economic or security-related interdependencies within one 
region (Börzel, 2013; see chapter 4 Börzel, this volume). Regional trade or security arrange-
ments are negotiated as solutions to these conflicts and problems. Constructivist as well as 
transactionalist approaches to regional integration (e.g. Deutsch et al., 1957; Adler and 
Barnett, 1998; Acharya, 2001; Acharya and Johnston, 2007b) focusing on communication 
and collective identities also concentrate on processes within one region in order to explain 
regionalism. 
A second account emphasizes interdependencies between regions. Regional organizations 
do not exist in isolation from each other, but models of regional cooperation and integration 
spread across the globe (Jetschke and Lenz, 2013). The focus of this work is on the diffusion 
of policies and institutional models. The most far-reaching diffusion account stems from soci-
ological institutionalism and claims that there are global scripts of what constitute legitimate 
institutions and that these scripts are emulated across the globe (Meyer, 1987; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991; Boli and Thomas, 1998). This chapter focuses on the diffusion of regional-
ism, regional organizations, and regional governance regime. 
It should be stated at the outset, though, that the two accounts are not mutually exclusive. 
Functional explanations for regional cooperation and integration can be combined with diffu-
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sion accounts with regard to institutional design. President Putin might have pushed for the 
establishment of the EEU to offer an alternative to the EU and EU association agreements in 
the Russian periphery (the functional account). The EEU’s institutional design, however, se-
lectively emulates EU institutions (the diffusion account). In the end, it is a question of em-
phasis and of the specific research question one wishes to answer, whether one focuses on 
independent or interdependent decision-making. 
This chapter begins by conceptualizing diffusion in terms of initial stimuli, items of diffusion 
(that what is being diffused), mechanisms, and outcomes (for a similar attempt see Solingen, 
2012; Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer, 2014). I distinguish between direct and indirect mecha-
nisms of diffusion and also differentiate between adoption/convergence and adapta-
tion/localization as diffusion outcomes. I then review the existing literature on the diffusion of 
regional organization (RO) focusing, first, on the diffusion of regionalism and regional orders, 
second, of institutional designs for regional organizations, and, third, of regional governance 
pertaining to specific policy areas. On the whole, the literature confirms that most ROs are 
created to solve regional conflicts or provide solutions for collective action problems (demand 
side). However, direct as well as indirect diffusion mechanisms account for the specific insti-
tutional designs of ROs and for the spread of policies among ROs (supply side). As to diffu-
sion outcomes, different modes of adaptation and localization seem to prevail. I conclude 
with some remarks on avenues for future research. 
 
Conceptualizing Diffusion: Stimuli, Mechanisms, and Outcomes 
Diffusion is a consequence of interdependence (Gilardi, 2013, 454; see also Jahn, 2006; 
Jahn, 2015; Solingen, 2012). If ROs emerge in complete isolation and independent from 
each other, there is no diffusion. I adopt Strang’s classic definition of diffusion as “any proc-
ess where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption 
for remaining nonadopters” (Strang, 1991, 325; see also Strang and Meyer, 1993; Gilardi, 
2013; see Solingen, 2012; Börzel and Risse, 2012a for the following).  
Several consequences follow from this conceptualization of diffusion. First, there has to be a 
stimulus of diffusion. As Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer point out, it makes a difference whether 
one envisions a single or multiple sources of diffusion processes (Klingler-Vidra and 
Schleifer, 2014). The EU, its institutions and policies would be a single source or stimulus, 
while there might be many in the case of diffusing Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs; see 
chapter 16 Kim et al., this volume). 
Second, we need to identify the object of diffusion processes, that what is being diffused. As 
Duina and Lenz argue, diffusion can occur with regard to problem definition, the framing of 
the problem, and the articulation of a specific solution (Duina and Lenz, 2014). In a similar 
vein, I distinguish between three such potential objects of diffusion pertaining to regionalism 
and regional organizations: 
 the idea of regionalism itself, i.e. regional institutional building, regional cooperation or 
integration; 
 institutional design features of specific – mostly formal - regional organizations (ROs); 




Third, diffusion relates to processes, not outcomes. For example, institutional or policy con-
vergence is an outcome of diffusion, not the process itself. This is often overlooked in the 
literature using institutional convergence as an indicator of diffusion (on policy convergence 
see Holzinger et al., 2008). The opposite of diffusion is not the divergence of institutional 
models for ROs, but isolated and independent decision-making on regional cooperation and 
integration. Diffusion processes cannot be measured by concentrating on outcomes alone, 
but the connection and interaction among actors needs to be taken into account (see Jahn, 
2015 for a detailed discussion).2 
If diffusion of regionalism refers to processes by which region-building, regional institutional 
solutions, and policies are affected by prior choices and policies of other world regions, diffu-
sion mechanisms assume center-stage. Building on Gilardi, 2013, Simmons et al., 2006, and 
Holzinger and Knill, 2008, I distinguish between two types of diffusion mechanisms and two 
logics of social action (see figure 1 below, following Börzel and Risse, 2012a; for similar dis-
tinctions with regard to Europeanization see Schimmelfennig, 2007): To begin with, ideas, 
policies, and institutions might diffuse through direct influence mechanisms. An agent of dif-
fusion actively promotes certain policies or institutional models in her interactions with a re-
ceiving actor or group of actors. Moreover, diffusion also occurs through indirect mecha-
nisms, whereby the action starts at the receiving end. For example, agents at a regional or-
ganization look for institutional designs in other regions to solve certain problems or to mimic 
the behaviour of their peers. Finally, I distinguish between the logic of consequences theo-
rized by various rational choice models, on the one hand, and the logics of appropriateness 
and of communicative rationality, on the other hand, as conceptualized by sociological insti-
tutionalism and various versions of social constructivism (on this distinction see March and 
Olsen, 1998). 
 
Figure 1: Diffusion Mechanisms 
 Logic of Consequences Logic of Appropriateness/ 
Arguing 
Direct Influence   Coercion 
 Positive Incentives and 
Negative Sanctions 
 Norms Socialization and 
Persuasion 
Indirect Diffusion/Emulation  Competition 
 Lesson Drawing 
 Normative Emulation 
 Mimicry 
Sources: Börzel and Risse, 2009b; Börzel and Risse, 2012a 
 
Let me go briefly through the various mechanisms. The first mechanism is often overlooked 
by scholars who define diffusion as voluntary responses to external stimuli, and concerns 
physical or legal coercion. Diffusion through imposition and the use of force might be ex-
tremely rare in the case of regionalism, while the enforcement of legal standards through 
inter-regional cooperation might occur more often. The EU’s imposition of the 1999 Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe for the Western Balkans following the wars in post-Yugoslavia 
is a rare example of forced regional cooperation. 
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A second mechanism concerns diffusion through manipulating utility calculations by provid-
ing negative and positive incentives. It differs from coercion and imposition in that the receiv-
ing actors still have a choice (even a rather remote one in some cases). The promoters of 
institutional models can induce other actors into adopting their ideas by trying to change their 
utility functions. They offer rewards, e.g. in form of financial and technical assistance, or im-
pose costs through sanctions or empowering domestic actors who push for the adoption of 
the institutional solution.  
A third mechanism works through the logic of appropriateness and involves socialization and 
persuasion. Rather than maximizing their egoistic self-interest, actors seek to meet social 
expectations in a given situation. Closely related to socialization, persuasion is based on 
communicative rationality or the logic of arguing (Risse, 2000). It refers to situations in which 
actors try to persuade each other about the validity claims inherent in any causal or norma-
tive statement. Mechanisms of persuasion are at work in inter-regional cooperation when 
ROs try to convince their counterparts of the benefits of increased regional cooperation 
(Hänggi et al., 2006; Baert et al., 2014).  
Diffusion processes do not require active promoters of ideas or institutional solutions. I dis-
tinguish four indirect mechanisms of emulation (see figure 1 above). Competition involves 
unilateral adjustments of behaviour toward “best practices.” Actors compete with each other 
over meeting certain performance criteria, e.g. creating employment or fostering economic 
growth to which they unilaterally adjust their behaviour accordingly (Elkins et al., 2006; 
Vogel, 1995; Busch et al., 2005).  
Lesson-drawing resembles competition insofar as actors look to others for policies and rules 
that effectively solved similar problems elsewhere and are transferable into their own context 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Lesson-drawing usually starts with 
actors who are faced with a particular political or economic problem requiring institutional 
change to solve it. They then look around for institutional solutions which are suitable to 
solve their problems.  
Both lesson-drawing and competition are based on instrumental rationality, since they follow 
a functional logic. But actors may also emulate others for normative reasons, e.g. to increase 
their legitimacy (Polillo and Guillén, 2005). Normative emulation is based on the logic of ap-
propriateness. For example, states might want to be members of an international community 
“in good standing” and, thus, seek regional cooperation to fight corruption, improve their hu-
man rights standards, or institute the rule of law. As a result, they look around for institutional 
solutions which they then emulate.  
While normative emulation still involves an active search process by an RO or other regional 
actor, the last mechanism, mimicry, entails a rather passive “downloading” of policy ideas or 
institutional models. ROs might imitate others because the appropriateness is taken for 
granted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Haveman, 1993). Mimicry includes habitualized practices 
and should, therefore, lead to convergence with regard to policies or institutional designs 
(Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer, 2014, 9). 
With the possible exception of mimicry, none of these diffusion mechanisms assumes that 
the agents at the receiving end of diffusion are simply passive recipients of these processes. 
This is obvious with regard to indirect diffusion mechanisms, but it is also relevant for the 
more direct influence mechanisms. The adoption of and adaptation to norms, rules, and insti-
tutional models into regional structures involve active processes of translation, interpretation, 
incorporation of new norms and rules into existing institutions, and also resistance to particu-
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lar rules and regulations (see also Solingen, 2012, 634). Social learning as a process of ac-
quiring and incorporating new norms and new understandings into one’s belief systems, for 
example, involves active engagement, not passive “downloading” of some new rules and 
institutional “software.” Amitav Acharya calls this “localization” processes (Acharya, 2004, 
2009).  
If we conceive of diffusion as active agentic processes, policy or norm adoption as well as 
institutional convergence are the least likely outcomes of diffusion processes (see also 
Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer, 2014, 9; Jahn, 2015). This might be surprising for those who 
measure diffusion via outcomes, but it follows logically from the conceptualization of diffusion 
processes above. Moreover, one would assume that convergence of institutional models and 
policies for ROs resulting from mimicry is likely to lead to behavioural “decoupling” (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991), that is, to non-compliance with institutional rules and to practices incon-
sistent with these norms and procedures. 
We can distinguish three different types of diffusion outcomes (see figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2: Diffusion Outcomes 
Adoption/convergence Convergence of institutional models and policies in regional co-
operation/integration 
Adaptation/transformation Differential adoption of institutional models and policies adjusting 
them to particular regional contexts; “localization”; “clustered 
convergence” of institutional models and policies in regional co-
operation/integration 
Resistance Explicit rejection of particular institutional models and policies as 
inadequate or illegitimate; continued divergence of institutional 
models and policies in regional cooperation/integration 
 
As mentioned above, adoption/convergence is only one and probably the least likely diffusion 
outcome. The more active regional actors graft the institutional models and policies and the 
more they adapt them to local circumstances, the more one would expect behavioural effects 
of these regional organizations. Adaptation or transformation then refers to a diffusion out-
come localizing a particular policy or institutional model and adjusting it to regional circum-
stances. Selective adoption of regional models is also included here. Adaptation and trans-
formation are the more likely, the more we find actors operating as “brokers” or “translators” 
between and within different regional contexts. 
Finally, it sounds odd to treat resistance as a diffusion outcome. However, the definition of 
diffusion as interdependent decision-making above includes the explicit refusal to adopt a 
particular policy or institutional solution. I concede, however, that rejection as a diffusion out-
come is hard to measure within quantitative diffusion research, since the non-adoption of 
policies or institutional models is indistinguishable from non-diffusion. Rather, we need to 
look at the discursive and communicative practices of actors in order to discern whether “dif-
fusion as rejection” actually took place. Moreover, one must include the possibility of “fire-
walls” preventing the diffusion of institutional models, norms, and policies (Solingen, 2012).  
Before I apply this conceptual framework to the diffusion of regionalism, regional institutions, 
and regional policies, several methodological remarks are in order (see also chapter 3 Levi-
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Faur, this volume): First, since diffusion is a process, measuring it via outcomes, as much of 
the literature does (see, however, Jahn, 2006; Simmons et al., 2008; overview in Gilardi, 
2013), is problematic. However, it is rather difficult to find valid indicators for the diffusion 
mechanisms mentioned above and to differentiate between them empirically.  
Second, the distinction between exogenous and endogenous (internal to a region) sources of 
regionalism and of regional institution-building is orthogonal to the difference between inde-
pendent and interdependent decision-making (see chapter 4 Börzel, this volume). Region-
building might be triggered by forces of globalization (see chapter 5 Solingen, this volume), 
but without any diffusion effects from either the global level or from other regions.  
Third, in an age of globalization, it is rather difficult to refute the “null hypothesis” of non-
diffusion or of completely independent decision-making. It is very unlikely, for example, that 
ROs in the 21st century choose institutional designs completely independent from each other. 
E.g., the initial impetus for regional institution-building might result from some functional – 
economic or security – problem in a particular region. Diffusion effects might then occur 
when actors look around for appropriate institutional solutions. In other words, explaining 
regional institution-building might require combining functional with diffusion accounts. There-
fore, a more plausible research strategy to explain regionalism, regional institutions and poli-
cies would be to determine the relative weight of independence and interdependence in or-
der to delineate the explanatory power of diffusion effects (see e.g. Acharya and Johnston, 
2007a; see also Duina and Lenz, 2014).  
As I will show in the following, comparative regionalism has a long way to go to be able to 
assign the relative weight of endogenous factors as compared to diffusion effects. Therefore, 
I will mostly report from studies which explicitly examine diffusion as a cause of regional co-
operation and integration. In other words, there is an inevitable selection bias in the following 
review. 
 
The Diffusion of Regional Cooperation and Integration 
A Global Spread of Regionalism? 
After World War II, there have been several waves of regionalism. Karns and Mingst distin-
guish between two waves of regionalism, the first occurring between the late 1940s and the 
1960s with the creation of ROs such as the Council of Europe (CoE), NATO, the European 
Economic Community (EEC), the OAS, ASEAN, the OAU, and the Arab League. The second 
wave followed in the 1980s and – especially – after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s 
(Mercosur, NAFTA, SADC etc.; see Karns and Mingst, 2004, ch. 5; see also chapter 2 
Söderbaum, this volume, and chapter 8-14, this volume). Particularly the latter “rise of re-
gionalism” has been largely driven by the increase in bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) which in turn result partially from the growing number of states in the post-Soviet 
space and from the break-up of the Warsaw Pact (see Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2013, 593; 
Börzel, 2013, 508-510; also Mansfield and Milner, 1999, 601; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). 
Moreover, multilateral PTAs have also taken on new members frequently, much more so 
than bilateral PTAs (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2013, 593). 
Two diffusion-related arguments are being made in the literature to account for the rise in 





Direct Influence on the World of Regions: The U.S. and the EU 
The probably most important account focusing on the U.S. role in the diffusion of regionalism 
since World War II is Katzenstein’s World of Regions (Katzenstein, 2005; but see also 
Solingen, 1998). He argues that U.S. structural power large shaped the regional orders in 
Asia and Europe – via Japan and Germany. Today’s regions are porous and, thus, subject to 
external influence. However, the interaction of U.S. power with regional forces led to two dis-
tinct regional orders, ethnic market capitalism in Asia and a legal institutional order centered 
around the EU in Europe. Katzenstein’s book is about regionalism and regional orders, not 
particular institutions, and it is about the long durée, i.e. fifty years of history after World War 
II. At the same time, the outcome of U.S. diffusion is adaptation and transformation, neither 
convergence nor rejection. Last not least, this book deals with all four diffusion mechanisms 
– from imposition (U.S. occupation of Japan and Germany after 1945) to incentives (e.g. U.S. 
Marshall plan as an incentive for European integration) to socialization (into liberal norms) 
and persuasion. 
While Katzenstein’s account can be read as a social constructivist version of hegemonic sta-
bility theory – not so much driven by U.S. material power, but by its ideational resources -, 
Walter Mattli’s work also focuses on the supply of regionalism by (regional) hegemons, from 
Prussia to the U.S. and nowadays Russia (Mattli, 1999). In contrast, Mansfield and Milner 
interpret the rise of PTAs as at least partially caused by declining U.S. (material) hegemony 
(Mansfield and Milner, 2012, ch. 3). 
As second explanatory account for the world of regions – regional multi-purpose organiza-
tions in this case – focuses on the EU and its explicit attempts to foster regional cooperation 
and integration. Hettne and Ponjaert go as far as to posit that the U.S. and the EU promote 
two different world orders through inter-regionalism, one based on sovereignty and unilateral-
ism (the U.S.), the other based on multilateralism (Hettne and Ponjaert, 2014). 
The EU Commission has specific programs in place to foster regionalization across the globe 
(Pietrangeli, 2009). There are Regional Strategy Papers and Regional Indicative Programs in 
place for all regions of the Global South.3 The EU does not promote its own institutional 
model of supranational integration (but see Bicci, 2006; Hurt, 2003), it advocates regional 
cooperation and integration going beyond mere free trade arrangements (FTA; see e.g. 
Farrell, 2007; Farrell, 2009; De Lombaerde and Schulz, 2009; Haastrup, 2013; Buzdugan, 
2013). It does so through its various inter-regional arrangements with other ROs (see chapter 
27 Ribeiro-Hoffmann, this volume; Hänggi et al., 2006; Baert et al., 2014).  
The EU employs the full spectrum of direct influence mechanisms to promote regionalism – 
particularly incentives, norms sozialization and persuasion through political dialogue (see 
Haastrup, 2013 for EU-AU relations). In exceptional cases, the EU even imposes regional 
cooperation, e.g. the 1999 Stability Pact for the Western Balkans. Incentives include market 
access to the EU through European Partnership Agreements (EPA), but also development 
aid, and the like. In the case of the South African Development Community (SADC) and its 
dependence on EU financial assistance, an EU threat to withdraw funds almost amounted to 
imposition from the outside (Lenz, 2012, 163-164; Buzdugan, 2013). Moreover, the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP) has been a quite active promoter of regional integration and of the 
European model, mostly by employing persuasion as the main direct influence mechanism 
(see below). 
The diffusion outcomes are harder to assess in this case. In particular, it is impossible to dis-
cern whether the rise and expansion of ROs in the Global South would have come about in 
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the absence of EU efforts to promote regionalism. The EU as a prime example of peace and 
prosperity might have a supportive effect on endogenous attempts toward regional coopera-
tion and integration (Haastrup, 2013 calls the EU a “mentor” with regard to Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, see also chapter 14 Hartmann, this volume). One counter-intuitive finding stands out, 
however: Inter-regional cooperation with the EU tends to strengthen regional cooperation 
among the EU’s weaker partners, simply as a way to increase their bargaining power vis-à-
vis the Europeans. Moreover, as work on ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting Process 
(ASEM) points out, inter-regional cooperation requires that the two regions themselves de-
velop their own regionness including a regional identity (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000). In 
this sense, “ASEM does indeed create a ‘regional’ space around which the states of East 
Asia may coalesce in a number of spheres” (Gilson, 2005, 309; see chapter 27 Ribeiro-
Hoffmann, this volume). 
Unfortunately, scholarly work on the diffusion of regionalism from one part of the world to 
another mostly focuses on the U.S., to the EU, and – to some degree – to Russia with regard 
to its periphery (see chapter 11 Hancock/Libman, this volume; Libman and Vinokurov, 2012; 
Wirminghaus, 2012). We know rather little about the effects of inter-regionalism in the Global 
South itself on region-building attempts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (but see chapter 7 
Acharya, this volume). This is strange, since diffusion research shows that policies and insti-
tutions spread particularly well among contiguous regions of the world (Simmons et al., 2008) 
and among like-minded actors. As a result, one would expect quite a lot more South-South 
diffusion of regionalism than is reflected in the scholarly literature. 
 
Emulation of Regionalism: Competition and Mimicry 
As to emulation mechanisms, there is strong evidence that PTAs and FTAs are contagious 
and that diffusion is at work here. As Mansfield and Milner argue, “PTAs often form in re-
sponse to each other at a given point in time and that the decision by a country to enter one 
in a given year strongly affects the probability of other countries doing likewise in the same 
year” (Mansfield and Milner, 2012, 91; see also Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012; Baccini and 
Dür, 2011; chapter 16 Kim et al., this volume). The statistics in these cases is mostly driven 
by bilateral PTAs. However, Jupille et al. also demonstrate that the likelihood that a state 
joins a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA; defined as a PTA among three or more contiguous 
states) increases with the number of RTAs in the system (Jupille et al., 2013). Mansfield and 
Pevehouse confirm that the same argument holds for the expansion of existing (and mostly 
multilateral) PTAs to new members indicating that diffusion is at work here (Mansfield and 
Pevehouse, 2013, 598).  
The main reason for these diffusion effects of bi- and multilateral PTAs is competition. The 
more states join PTAs, the more other states fear loss of competitiveness if they do not join, 
too, and thus get preferential access to markets. Baccini and Dür claim that exporters facing 
trade diversion because they are excluded from a PTA are likely to push their governments 
into signing a PTA with the country where their exports are threatened (Baccini and Dür, 
2011). Baccini and Dür also find some support for normative emulation or even mimicry 
which they measure via spatial cultural affinity such as a common language. 
We also find South-South emulation of regionalism. The South African Development Coordi-
nation Conference, SADC’s predecessor, which was founded in 1980, was not only a reac-
tion to Apartheid South Africa, but was also inspired by Latin America’s developmental struc-
turalism, particularly Raul Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America 
9 
 
(CEPAL; see chapter 9 Bianculli, this volume; quotes?).4 Moreover and more recently, Brazil 
and MERCOSUR developed a competitive counter-model to the US-led diffusion of PTAs in 
Latin America as a result of which we now find two different patterns of PTA designs in Latin 
America (Quiliconi, 2014). 
Jupille et al. (2013) advance the emulation-based explanation further, namely sociological 
institutionalism and world polity theory as put forward by John Meyer and his colleagues (see 
e.g. Meyer, 1987, Meyer et al., 1997). Jupille et al. argue that “regionalism” has become part 
of the global script constituting modern statehood, namely that legitimate members of the 
international community ought to belong to some RTA. The authors claim that this script is 
promoted by “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992) and use “Google NGrams” (the use of 
the term “regionalism” in Google books) as a proxy. Jupille et al. show that the “regionalism” 
script correlates with the time-lagged rise in states joining RTAs in a statistically significant 
way. They also demonstrate that this correlation is particularly relevant for states in the glob-
al South which are in greater need for legitimacy than states in the global North (Jupille et al., 
2013). The world polity argument, of course, emphasizes mimicry leading to decoupling and 
rather ineffective regional organizations. 
Finally, there is one more diffusion story about the spread of regionalism, again emphasizing 
competition. In this case, however, the issue is competition between regions themselves. 
E.g., NAFTA can be regarded as a direct response to the EU’s single market (Duina, 2006; 
see chapter 8 Duina, this volume). Moreover, post-Soviet Russia has become a major re-
gion-builder in Eurasia (Libman and Vinokurov, 2012; see chapter 11 Hancock/Libman, this 
volume) in direct response to and competition with the EU. This has been partly an attempt 
to secure a sphere of influence in Russia’s “near abroad,” but also an effort to counter the 
EU’s attempt at democratic region-building with regionalism among (semi-) autocratic re-
gimes. 
In sum, particularly International Political Economy (IPE) approaches to regionalism empha-
size indirect diffusion mechanisms with regard to PTAs (see chapter 16 Kim et al., this vol-
ume). However, most of this work focuses on “shallow” regionalism and the analyses are 
driven by the rise of bilateral PTAs. While there is strong reason to believe that the findings 
also pertain to multilateral regional arrangements, diffusion mechanisms and effects are un-
der-researched with regard to regionalism per se. In addition, the “world of regions” is no 
longer driven by the U.S. and the EU (see above), but there is competition among and be-
tween regions as the Russian (and maybe Chinese) examples demonstrate. Last not least, 
as mentioned above, there is little work on South-South diffusion of regionalism and even 
less scholarship on emulation and mimicry within particular regions. However, it is hard to 
imagine that the sub-Saharan “spaghetti bowl” (Baldwin, 2006) or the Latin American and 
Asian “alphabet soups” of ROs (Acharya, 2010) came about without any diffusion mecha-
nism at play. 
So far, I have focused on the diffusion of regionalism and region-building as such. In the next 
section, I deal with the diffusion of specific institutional designs for ROs. 
 
Diffusion of Regional Institutional Designs 
If we assume autonomous decision-making rather than interdependence between regions, 
we should expect very little similarities in the institutional designs of regional organizations 
(RO) – unless regions are faced with exactly the same functional as well as collective action 
problems. In a globalized and interdependent world, however, such independence is rather 
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unlikely. Indeed, we can observe striking similarities in the institutional design of ROs across 
the globe. They do not all look alike, but they certainly form clusters (see Baccini et al., 2014 
for trade agreements, Alter, 2012, 2014 for courts, see also chapters 16 Kim et al., and 17 
Alter/Hooghe, both this volume). 
Moreover, if we distinguish between scope or breadth or regional cooperation and integration 
(referring to the number of policy issues dealt with at the regional level), on the one hand, 
and level of depth of integration (concerning the degree of political authority of ROs over po-
litical issues delegated to them; see Börzel, 2013, 507, on these distinctions), we can ob-
serve an increase in both dimensions of delegation over time (see Börzel, 2013, 510-512, for 
the following). And this trend does not only concern the EU, but also other multi-purpose 
ROs such as the League of Arab States, ASEAN, ECOWAS, MERCOSUR, and even 
NAFTA. Not only have these ROs taken on new tasks, member states have also delegated 
ever more political authority to these ROs. Of course, none of these ROs matches the EU in 
terms of policy scope and level of supranationalism. But the EU no longer stands out as an 
institution “sui generis,” if it ever has (see chapter 23 Lenz/Marks, this volume). 
How can this development be explained, and what does a diffusion perspective contribute? 
 
Direct Influence Mechanisms 
There have, of course, been attempts by ROs such as the EU as well as global powers such 
as the U.S. to promote their preferred institutional models in other parts of the world, particu-
larly the Global South. In a stylized version, the U.S. promotes rule-based Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs) without strong regional organizations (such as NAFTA), while the EU pushes supra-
nationalism (Börzel and Risse, 2009a, 22; Duina, 2006). It is certainly true (see above) that 
particularly the EU promotes regional cooperation and integration, commands an entire tool-
box of means to do so, and uses direct influence mechanisms to further these goals. Moreo-
ver, Baccini et al. show that PTAs with members who have close relations to the U.S. tend to 
adopt the NAFTA model (Baccini et al., 2014) which also might be due to some direct influ-
ence mechanism (see also chapter 8 Duina, this volume).  
On the whole, however, it is not obvious that particularly the EU tries to export its particular 
institutional model of supranational integration and the same holds true for the U.S. which is 
far less active in promoting regionalism going beyond FTAs (see e.g. De Lombaerde and 
Schulz, 2009; Baert et al., 2014 for details on the EU; on the U.S. see Beeson, 2006). As I 
argue below, in most cases the EU reacts – positively, of course – to emulation attempts by 
ROs in the Global South.  
Moreover, direct diffusion attempts by the EU and the U.S. often meet with resistance in the 
Global South, given the history of colonialism and economic dependency. As Amitav Acharya 
points out, the “ASEAN way” of non-intervention in internal affairs and of informal – “soft” – 
institutionalism largely originated in direct opposition to EU and U.S. efforts at pushing re-
gional integration (Acharya, 2009; see chapter 12 Jetschke/Katada, this volume). The same 
holds true for Subsaharan Africa (see the origins of SADC as an anti-South African as well 
as anti-Western development community based on collective identity of struggles against 
colonialism and apartheid) as well as the Middle East (see Fawcett and Gandois, 2010; 
Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). 
The indirect diffusion of institutional models and scripts has been more successful as the 




Emulation of Regional Institutional Designs 
With regard to indirect diffusion mechanisms such as competition, lesson-drawing, as well as 
normative emulation and mimicry, there has been more quantitative as well as qualitative 
work to allow for at least tentative conclusions. Overall, these studies emphasize lesson-
drawing as well as normative emulation, but also mimicry. With regard to diffusion outcomes, 
these mechanisms result mostly in adaptation/transformation, but also wholesale adoption of 
institutional models in few cases. 
Unfortunately, most of the available work on diffusion of institutional designs focuses on dif-
fusion from the Global North to the Global South. Studies on horizontal diffusion among re-
gions in the Global South are extremely rare – except for Asian ROs. Acharya argues, for 
example, that ASEAN largely inspired the establishment of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1986 (Acharya, 2009, 108-109; see also Ahmed, 2013, 
ch. 8). The ASEAN+3 framework has also diffused ASEAN’s institutional design to Northeast 
Asia. Last not least, the institutional design of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) has emulated ASEAN to some degree. In this sense, ASEAN has become a model 
for regional cooperation, if not integration, in the Asia-Pacific region (chapter 12 Jetschke/ 
Katada, this volume). 
With regard to PTAs, Baccini et al. show the emergence of three distinct clusters of similar 
institutional designs (Baccini et al., 2014). One PTA cluster consists of rather narrow agree-
ments whereby the member agree on the reduction of tariffs with regard to some goods. The 
second cluster contains rule-base agreements without strong regional institutions modeled 
after NAFTA (see also Duina, 2006; chapter 8 Duina, this volume), while the third PTA clus-
ter emulates the EU model. Baccini et al. find that more recent PTAs mostly resemble the 
NAFTA model, while EU type ROs are more common among PTAs with many member 
states (Baccini et al., 2014). Interestingly enough, EU style agreements do not seem to de-
pend on strong interactions between the respective PTAs and the EU itself. 
Moving toward qualitative research on the diffusion of RO institutional design, ASEAN repre-
sents a fascinating example of lesson-drawing and normative emulation leading to selective 
adaption and transformation of institutional designs which originated elsewhere, particularly 
in Europe. Conventional wisdom has it that Southeast Asia explicitly rejected the “European 
way” developing its own “ASEAN way” (e.g. Acharya, 2009; Katzenstein, 2005; Murray, 
2010; Khong and Nesadurai, 2007). To be fair, ASEAN has not yet embraced supranational 
decision-making in a substantial way and, thus, remains wedded to national sovereignty. 
However, more recent research shows that ASEAN member states have selectively emulat-
ed institutional models from the EU – even in cases in which ASEAN members explicitly ar-
gued that this was not the case (Jetschke, 2009, Jetschke and Murray, 2012; Jetschke, 
2010; see also chapter 12 Jetschke/Katada, this volume). Prominent examples include the 
ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives (modeled after the EU COREPER; 
Murray and Moxon-Browne, 2013) and the ASEAN Charter. 
In each of these cases, the initiative to emulate emerged from some cooperation problem in 
Asia itself, e.g. the Asian financial crisis. However, the selective adaptation of EU institutional 
design features followed a normative emulation rather than a rationalist lesson-drawing path, 
since the EU was considered a legitimate actor among ASEAN member states. Driven by 
this attempt at normative emulation, ASEAN members directly linked up with counterparts in 
the EU who then advised them as to particular institutional design issues (Jetschke and 
12 
 
Murray, 2012, 177). ASEM also became part of this diffusion process (Gilson, 2005; see also 
Gilson, 2002). In this case then, the desire to emulate European institutions triggered more 
direct influence mechanisms. 
Similar normative emulation mechanisms have been at play in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as 
Latin America. As in the ASEAN story, the diffusion of EU institutional design models to the 
Global South started with cooperation problems in the regions themselves. In Sub-Sahara 
Africa, it was not so much collective action issues emanating from economic interdepend-
ence (there is very little, see chapter 14 Hartmann, this volume), but mostly security issues or 
– in the case of SADC - the necessity to cooperate among the front states facing apartheid 
South Africa. In contrast, region-building processes in Latin America were primarily driven by 
liberal market-oriented governments in Argentina and Brazil coming into power in the late 
1980s. 
As Lenz argues, both South African and South American governments faced two choices 
regarding institutional design, the NAFTA model supported by the U.S. and the EU model 
(Lenz, 2012). Both SADC and Mercosur emulated the EU common market design, not be-
cause of a lengthy rational learning process, but for reasons of legitimacy (and against U.S. 
pressure in the South American case; on Mercosur see also Duina, 2006; on SADC see 
Weiland, 2006). Similar emulation processes can be observed with regard to the East African 
Community (EAC), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the An-
dean Community (CAN; on the EAC see Van Hoestenberghe et al., 2009, chapter 14 Hart-
mann, this volume; on WAEMU see Claeys and Sindzingre, 2003; on CAN see Bustamante 
and Giacalone, 2009; chapter 9 Bianculli, this volume). With regard to the latter, almost 
wholesale mimicry took place and CAN member states “downloaded” the EU’s design with 
regard to several institutions, particularly the Andean Court of Justice (see below). 
As in the case of ASEAN, normative emulation was facilitated greatly by various European-
Latin American as well as European-African epistemic communities of experts in regional 
integration, lawyers, and parliamentarians (Botto, 2009; Lenz, 2012, 164; Costa and Dri, 
2014; Smis and Kingah, 2014; on epistemic communities in general see Haas, 1992). These 
transnational groupings served as agents of diffusion counseling ROs in the Global South 
and their member states.  
Regional courts and dispute settlement systems are a particularly interesting example for the 
diffusion of institutional designs (see chapter 24 Alter/Hooghe, this volume). Alter has identi-
fied altogether 24 international (incl. regional) courts out of which 22 are “new style” courts 
with compulsory jurisdication and/or access for supranational or private actors (Alter, 2014, 
ch. 3). Half of those “new style” courts represent institutional copies of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), eleven altogether (Alter, 2012). And the ECJ itself constitutes a partial diffu-
sion from another and prior European court, the Court of Justice of the European Coal and 
Steel Community, as Duina and Lenz point out (Duina and Lenz, 2014). Prominent examples 
of ECJ diffusion include the Andean Tribunal of Justice and various African courts (see Lenz, 
2012; Alter and Helfer, 2010; Saldias, 2010). While wholesale adoption of the ECJ has been 
rare (e.g. the Andean court), many ROs emulated its central features. In most cases, the 
initial impulse to establish ECJ style supranational courts resulted from some functional prob-
lems, e.g. the attempt to signal a commitment to market integration (Alter, 2012, 145). How-
ever, as in most other cases of diffusion of regional institutional design, transnational net-
works of judges, lawyers, and other epistemic communities stepped in counseling the RO on 
the design of the respective courts. In a few cases, the EU and the ECJ themselves advised 
the designer of the regional courts (e.g. Saldias, 2010). 
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Thus, we observe the gradual diffusion of courts and dispute settlement mechanisms at-
tached to ROs around the globe. While regional economic cooperation and integration cre-
ates a functional demand for at least dispute settlement mechanisms, the institutional design 
of such arbitration as well as judicial institutions to third bodies is mostly due to emulation, 
both lesson-drawing and normative emulation. Finally, we also see the increasing diffusion of 
parliamentary bodies related to ROs, even in authoritarian contexts. As Lenz points out, this 
development is hard to explain by any functional account, but appears to represent norma-
tive emulation “all the way down” (Lenz, 2013; see also Rüland and Bechle, 2014; for a dif-
ferent account see Dri, 2010). As is to be expected, wholesale adoption of institutional mod-
els, however, mostly leads to largely symbolic parliamentary bodies without any serious role 
in decision-making. In other words, “parliamentarization” reinforces intergovernmentalism in 
the end, as Rüland and Bechle argue (Rüland and Bechle, 2014). 
In sum, emulation appears to be the primary mechanism in the diffusion of institutional de-
signs of ROs that then triggers direct influence through persuasion and norms socialization 
via epistemic communities and other agents. Moreover, diffusion outcomes are mostly selec-
tive adaptation and transformation of institutional models, less so wholesale adoption (as 
with regional parliamentary bodies). The ASEAN CPR’s institutional design resembles, but is 
not identical to the EU’s COREPER (Murray and Moxon-Browne, 2013). Thus, localization 
matters hugely (Rüland, 2014; on the concept see Acharya, 2004) – so does domestic poli-
tics. The latter is largely under-theorized in the literature on diffusion of regional institutions 
(but see Solingen, 1998; chapter 5 Solingen/Malnight, this volume). 
Similar dynamics can be observed with regard to the diffusion of regional governance in par-
ticular issue areas. 
 
Diffusion of Regional Governance 
So far and with the exception of regional trade arrangements (see above), this chapter has 
concentrated on the diffusion of design features of formal regional institutions. I will now turn 
to the diffusion of regional regimes governing specific policy areas (see also chapters 15-22, 
this volume).  
 
Direct Influence Mechanisms 
Once again, the EU seems to be the only regional organization which tries to diffuse particu-
lar governance regimes directly in its dealings with other ROs, mainly through the mecha-
nisms of inter-regional cooperation (overviews in De Lombaerde and Schulz, 2009; Baert et 
al., 2014; Rigner and Söderbaum, 2010; Börzel and Risse, 2009a; see also chapter 27 
Ribeiro-Hoffmann, this volume). E.g., the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) of the EU 
with the various African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) regional organizations in the frame-
work of the Coutenou Agreement which have been concluded or are still being negotiated,5 
include provisions for human rights promotion and sustainable development. In addition, the 
EU seeks to promote good governance and regional security and stability in its dealings with 
other ROs (Börzel and van Hüllen, 2011; Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2015). And it has instituted 
migration clauses in its trade agreements with regional partners (Jurje and Lavenex, 2014; 
see also chapter 21 Givens, this volume). The diffusion mechanisms used in this context 
concern both positive incentives (i.e., foreign aid conditionality) and socialization as well as 





I have already dealt with the diffusion of institutional designs for PTAs where two global 
scripts emanating from the Global North compete, namely the NAFTA and the EU designs. In 
addition, the promotion of democracy, human rights, and good governance has become a 
global script which ROs increasingly try to foster with regard to their member states and in 
their external relations (see Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2015; Pevehouse, 2005; McMahon and 
Baker, 2006; Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2010; see chapter 22 Pevehouse, this 
volume). The same holds true for gender rights (chapter 19 Van der Vleuten, this volume). 
While some of these provisions have been promoted by the EU, emulation is the main 
mechanism by which these governance regimes diffuse. While the script originated in the 
West, it has become global now as a result of which even ROs of authoritarian states such 
as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization now adopt their own election monitoring.  
Emulation mechanisms include competition (democracy, human rights, and good govern-
ance clauses as means to invite trade and foreign direct investment), lesson drawing (to lock 
in democratic governance among RO member states, see Moravcsik, 2000; Pevehouse, 
2005), and normative emulation (as a quest to gain global legitimacy as members of the in-
ternational community “in good standing”; see McMahon and Baker, 2006). Stapel has 
shown through a quantitative study that there is not only isomorphism on a global level (mim-
icry, see DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), but that geographic contiguity of ROs matters, too 
(Stapel, 2014). He also demonstrates that functional needs (learning) explain the diffusion of 
democracy and good governance standards among ROs, while power asymmetries appear 
to hamper adoption. This is one of the first studies which does not adopt an EU-centric view 
of policy diffusion among ROs. 
Once again, ASEAN constitutes a fascinating example of normative emulation, selective ad-
aptation, and localization resulting from resistance Western pressures to incorporate human 
rights norms. As Manea argues, ASEAN transformed its collective identity as it selectively 
adapted to human rights norms (Manea, 2008, 2009; see also Katsumata, 2009). 
Policy regime diffusion among ROs is not confined to the spread of human rights, democ-
racy, and good governance standards, though. A very interesting example in the realm of 
security cooperation concerns the spread of military confidence building measures (CBM) 
which originated in the Conference (now Organization) for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) during the Cold War. CBMs have been adopted by ASEAN and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the pri-
mary mechanism being mimicry (Katsumata, 2011; Acharya and Johnston, 2007a, 20; 
Acharya, 2009, ch. 5; see chapter 15 Kacowicz/Press-Barnathan, this volume). From 
ASEAN, these conflict management policies have spread to South Asia (Jetly, 2003). 
ASEAN also selectively adopted EU market regulation policies, the variation in outcomes can 
be explained by domestic politics (Pente, 2013). It also emulated the EU’s disaster manage-
ment mechanism in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004 (Pennisi di Floristella, 
2014), while ASEAN’s adoption of HIV/AIDS norms diffused from the global level, namely 
UNAIDS (Collins, 2013). 
The latter examples which include at least some cases of South-South and Global-South 
diffusion confirm, once again, the necessity to combine functional explanations with accounts 
assuming interdependent decision-making. To use the framework suggested by Duina and 
Lenz, problem identification usually originates within the region itself, while both framing and 
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solutions (scripts) can only be explained if one takes diffusion effects into account (Duina and 
Lenz, 2014). But even then, the result is not wholesale adoption of policy regimes, but their 
selective adaptation and transformation to adjust them to regional circumstances. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter attempted to provide an overview of the state of the art on the diffusion of mod-
els pertaining to regionalism, the institutional design of specific ROs, and to particular policy 
regimes adopted by ROs. The diffusion perspective assumes interdependent rather than 
independent decision-making, i.e., that choices by ROs are conditioned by previous choices 
made by other regional or international organizations. Such a focus on diffusion of regional 
institutional models and governance regimes has faced several difficulties.  
First, the literature on comparative regionalism assumes independent decision-making most 
of the time concentrating on functional accounts (chapter 4 Börzel, this volume) and often 
overlooks diffusion mechanisms. Second, the quantitative literature on diffusion among re-
gions - particularly on PTAs and FTAs - focuses on outcomes rather than processes as a 
result of which institutional and policy convergence rather than differential adaptation and 
transformation become the yardsticks.  
Third, while qualitative work on diffusion in comparative regionalism rightly concentrates on 
mechanisms rather than outcomes, most empirical work is still rather Euro- and Western-
centric (see chapter 7 Acharya, this volume). It follows that we know much more about the 
spread of Western (particularly EU) regionalism, institutional designs, and policy regimes 
across the globe than about South-South, intra-Asian, intra-African, or intra-Latin American 
diffusion processes. Yet, as the broader diffusion literature has demonstrated time and again, 
contiguity appears to be a major variable explaining diffusion processes. 
It follows from these limitations that the degree of diffusion of models for regional institutions 
and policies is probably severely underestimated. At the same time, the studies discussed in 
this chapter suffer from a selection bias in favour of diffusion processes. The long and short 
of this is that we do not know at the moment how much regional cooperation and integration 
is primarily due to processes internal to the region or in response to globalization pressures 
(independent decision-making; see chapters 4 Börzel and 5 Solingen/Malnight, this volume) 
and what role diffusion mechanisms play in comparison. As suggested above, however, 
functional accounts emphasizing independent decision-making and diffusion cannot be 
treated as dichotomous alternatives, but matters of degree.  
Despite these limitations, the chapter yields some tentative conclusions: First, the diffusion of 
regionalism, institutional designs, and regional governance seems to be primarily driven by 
indirect mechanisms of emulation rather than by direct influence mechanisms (see figure 1 
above). While particularly the EU tries to promote regionalism, institutional designs and re-
gional policies, the effects appear to be limited, the more we leave the EU’s neighbourhood. 
In fact, the EU as an institutional model of integration might be most attractive when it is not 
promoting any particular regional solution, but is simply going about its own business. This 
can be shown especially with regard to the one region that has self-identified mostly in terms 
of difference to Europe, namely Asia (see chapter 12 Jetschke/Katada, this volume). 
Second, as far as emulation mechanisms are concerned, we can observe few examples of 
mimicry leading to institutional isomorphism. Competition, lesson drawing, and normative 
emulation seem to be the most important diffusion mechanisms by which particular institu-
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tional models and policy regimes spread. In this context, ROs engage in a search processes 
for the best available institutional or policy solution (lesson-drawing) and also emulate those 
ROs which they consider normatively legitimate. This is where the “power of attraction” of the 
EU and of contiguous ROs plays a role. 
Third, as to diffusion outcomes (see figure 2 above), we can rarely observe full-scale adop-
tion or convergence around specific models of regional cooperation and integration. If con-
vergence happens, decoupling between institutional rules and behavioural practices is the 
most likely result. This would explain why many ROs in Subsaharan Africa and in Latin 
America have so few behavioural consequences (see chapters 9 Bianculli and 14 Hartmann, 
this volume). The most likely outcome of diffusion with regard to regional cooperation and 
integration appears to be selective adaptation and transformation. Institutional models and 
policy regimes are mostly adjusted and “localized” (Acharya, 2004) into the particular re-
gional contexts. Diffusion is an active process of translation and transformation, not a pas-
sive “downloading” of some institutional software for ROs. 
Fourth, as to how functional explanations and diffusion accounts relate to each other, my 
tentative conclusion from the literature suggests that the demand for regional cooperation 
and integration usually originates in the particular region in response to some internal or ex-
ternal problem (“problematization” in Duina and Lenz, 2014; see also Börzel and Risse, 
2012b). Diffusion takes place on the supply side of both meaning construction and framing 
and the identification of specific solutions with regard to institutional designs and governance 
regimes. 
Finally, future research on the diffusion of regionalism and regional institutions should focus 
on processes of translation and localization. At this point, diffusion research seriously ne-
glects the domestic politics of regional institution-building – a central theme of conventional 
theories of cooperation and integration (see Wood, 2014 for a similar point with regard to the 
transnational diffusion of civil wars). While the latter approaches regularly ignore diffusion 
processes and outcomes, the domestic politics of localization remains probably the largest 
gap in the emerging literature on diffusing regionalism (see also chapter 5 Solingen/ Mal-
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1 This paper is a draft chapter for Tanja A. Börzel/Thomas Risse (eds.), Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Regionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in prep.). I thank the contributors 
to this handbook for their critical input to and help with this chapter, particularly Andrea 
Bianculli, Tanja Börzel, Jeffrey Checkel, Anja Jetschke, Galia Press-Barnathan, Fredrik 
Söderbaum, Etel Solingen, and Sören Stapel. The cross-references are to other chapters in 
the Oxford Handbook. 
2 I owe this point to numerous conversations with Detlef Jahn.  
3 See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/rsp/rsp_10th_edf_en.htm (last 
access May 1, 2014). 
4 Fredrik Söderbaum alerted me to this point. 
5 On the current status see 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf (last visited May 
30, 2014). 
